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Decision-making on mega-projects is beset by a multitude of problems. Cost overruns and 
disappointing achievements are already well documented. Some of these pitfalls appear in the 
initial stages of the decision-making: the absence of an appropriate problem analysis, the lack of 
alternatives, ambiguities about scope, no programme of functional requirements, flawed process 
architecture and the dissemination of contested information. 
But all sorts of uncertainties arise in the long periods between the initiative and the start of 
operations. Very often, unforeseen developments are triggered by political discontinuity and 
market dynamics. 
This paper helps to address this situation by providing an overview of the impact of market 
dynamics and political discontinuity (which are sometimes interrelated) on decision-making on 
mega-projects. We analyse these impacts and attempt to determine ways in which project 
managers could deal with them. The identification and allocation of risks among public and 
private players is a crucial variable. 
The paper aims to contribute to theories of decision-making on mega-projects and puts forward 
practical recommendations for the relevant parties. 
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1. Introduction 
The academic literature discusses many of the pitfalls that can occur on the long and winding 
path between the conceptualisation and the realisation of major infrastructure projects. The 
mega-projects referred to in this paper cover different kinds of infrastructure including roads, 
railways, dykes, airports, bridges, energy transport, electronic communication, drinking water, 
sewage and waste. It is not our intention to produce a list of all the pitfalls that can plague a 
mega-project but to focus on those that occur in the early stages of the decision-making and their 
relationship with political discontinuity and market dynamics. 
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These pitfalls, though problematic in their own right, are also central to other – already well-
documented pitfalls – such as cost overruns and shortcomings in achievements (Flyvbjerg et al., 
2003).  
The questions addressed in this paper are as follows: 
1. What are the main pitfalls in the early stages of decision-making processes on mega-projects? 
2. What is the potential impact of political discontinuity on mega-projects, which are invariably 
characterised by a long period of decision-making? 
3. What is the potential impact of market dynamics on such mega-projects? 
General infrastructure projects are required to meet certain criteria. The Dutch Scientific Council 
for Government Policy (WRR, 2008: 35) applies two types of criteria for infrastructures. Over the 
last two decades most infrastructures have undergone a significant change in regime, which has 
led to a stronger emphasis on service, lower prices and enhanced consumer choice as well as a 
greater concern for efficiency. These issues fall under Type I criteria. This regime change consists 
of five elements: liberalization, privatization, unbundling, corporatization and 
internationalization. It has addressed, in particular, Type I market failures, which are 
characterised by the absence of proper market forces. WRR (2008: 36) argues that, nowadays, a 
strategy is needed that can also address Type II market failures, which are characterised by 
ineffective realisation of long-term public values, such as innovation, safety, health and the 
environment. The WRR (2008: 36) also describes the kind of strategic policy that is needed to 
secure long-term investments in physical infrastructures under the new regime and to meet the 
challenges these infrastructures will have to meet in the future. It does not, however, offer clear 
solutions for the long timespan of decision-making or the sometimes fatal blow that political 
discontinuity and market dynamics in the decision-making process can inflict on mega-projects. 
These issues will be addressed in this paper. But first, we shall discuss some general pitfalls in the 
early stages of decision-making on mega-projects. We shall follow WRR (2008) and apply both 
Type I and Type II criteria. 
Sections 2-7 identify a number of pitfalls in decision-making on mega-projects: absence of a 
problem analysis, lack of project alternatives, ambiguities about the scope, no programme of 
functional requirements, flawed process architecture and the dissemination of contested 
information. 
The core of the paper is formed by Sections 8 and 9 which deal with the impact of political 
discontinuity and market dynamics on decision-making on mega-projects respectively. Section 10 
deals with the identification and allocation of risks among public and private players. Finally, 
Section 11 presents conclusions and recommendations. 
The paper is based on the personal experience of the author as research coordinator for the Dutch 
Parliamentary Commission on Mega-projects (TCI, 2004), a literature review and interviews with 
people at the cutting edge. 
It presents empirical evidence and puts forward recommendations for both politicians and 
practitioners. The tone of the paper is somewhat normative; it does not aspire to launch new rules 
or regulations. 
2. Pitfall no. 1: absence of a proper problem analysis 
A mega-project is – at best – a solution. This statement implies that there is at least one problem 
to which a mega-project is the most expedient response. A proper problem analysis is essential to 
determine whether a proposed project is effective, efficient and legitimate (Altshuler & Luberoff, 
 
EJTIR 10(1), March 2010, pp. 19-29 
Priemus 
21 
Decision-making on Mega-projects: Drifting on Political  
Discontinuity and Market Dynamics 
 
2003; Priemus, 2008). The first question that should be asked is: what is or what are the 
problem(s)? And then: what is the problem now and what is it likely to become in the short and 
the long term? And finally, who is affected by the problem? One player’s problem might be 
another player’s solution. 
Problems relating to transport infrastructure often emerge in the form of locations that are 
insufficiently accessible at present or are expected to be so in the future. This may go hand in 
hand with an increased risk of economic stagnation caused by growing congestion (measured in 
lost vehicle hours). Sometimes there are additional health and safety problems as a result of 
emissions (air quality). 
As all of this impinges on mobility, people tend to see the problem in terms that extend farther 
than just accessibility or stagnation. They point to the decline in residential and commercial 
appeal and the prospect of a deteriorating living climate, reduced quality of life and a decline or 
stagnation in business leading to job insecurity and uncertain economic growth. This implicit 
connection between mobility and the living and economic climate is usually difficult to 
substantiate and often bears witness to a long list of policy ambitions which cannot be supported 
by valid insights. 
In practice, it is barely possible – and usually impossible – to establish a causal relationship 
between improved accessibility and an upturn in the regional economy (Rietveld, 1989; 
Vickerman, 1989; 2000; Banister & Berechman, 2000). 
As problems are often perceived differently by different players, it is not only essential to 
conduct a problem analysis but also to reach the strongest possible consensus. A shared problem 
analysis enhances the possibility that the selected alternative will still be endorsed by everyone 
farther down the line and survive changes in government coalitions. If there is still a difference of 
opinion on the analysis, it is usually the authorised political body (parliament, regional or 
municipal council) that decides on the problems that will form the departure point.  
In later stages other differences of opinion may arise around issues of contested information 
(Section 7). Decision-making on mega-projects is not usually linear. Sometimes a problem 
analysis has to be reformulated at a later date. 
3. Pitfall no. 2: lack of project alternatives 
Once the problem analysis has been sorted out, it is time to think seriously about potential 
solutions. It is best to appraise alternatives in the initial stages. After all, everyone knows that 
more than one road leads to Rome.  
Potential alternatives can be tested in the light of the problem analysis; so, certain matters need to 
be concretely and promptly specified (Findeisen & Quade, 1985): 
• the values and criteria; 
• the objectives of the public and private bodies who bear responsibility; 
• the boundaries and constraints. 
A cost-benefit analysis can be drawn up for each alternative. Conflicts can easily arise if the 
various parties have different ideas about these matters. Experience has shown that it makes 
sense to identify potential pitfalls at an early stage and to establish a workable consensus. Other 
pitfalls may, of course, arise along the way. Complexity is inherent in decision-making processes 
on mega-projects. It cannot be simplified away and is one of the reasons why these processes are 
seldom linear.  
 
EJTIR 10(1), March 2010, pp. 19-29 
Priemus 
22 
Decision-making on Mega-projects: Drifting on Political  
Discontinuity and Market Dynamics 
 
An investment project is not always the right answer to a problem. The Dutch Ministry of 
Transport, Public Works and Water Management (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2004) 
differentiates three types of solutions for transport infrastructure: utilisation, pricing and 
building. First, action can be taken to make better use of the capacity of the existing 
infrastructure. Congestion might easily arise on certain routes during the rush hour. But can 
mobility in the opposite direction be augmented? Or mobility outside rush hours? That is the first 
question. The second is whether a price tag can be attached to the use of infrastructure in the 
form of a user charge, such as road pricing. Experience has shown that people curtail their use of 
infrastructure if it hits their pocket (Verhoef et al., 2008). If the rates were differentiated in terms 
of time and place, pricing could lead to better utilisation of the existing infrastructure. If 
utilisation and pricing are not enough, then new infrastructure or expansions to the current 
infrastructure can be considered. 
The ‘building’ solution embraces various alternatives: different routes, different modalities, 
different cross-sections (e.g. two-lane, four-lane, six-lane) and different types of spatial 
integration (for instance, to conserve nature or prevent urban pollution). 
In real life we often witness situations in which alternatives are put forward at the last minute by, 
for example, those opposed to the government-favoured plan. It is a pity that alternatives are not 
systematically recognised at a very early stage. 
4. Pitfall no. 3: ambiguities about the scope of the project 
It is difficult to decide on the ‘optimal’ scope of a project at an early stage. In most cases, the 
scope will not be limited to the line infrastructure but will extend to the development of a wider 
area. Nodes should be developed near and around stopping places or junctions, as the 
anticipated increase in the value of land around these nodes can finance unprofitable constituents 
and/or enhance the quality of the plan. 
It can take a lot of brain-racking to spatially accommodate a mega-project. It is all about finding 
the best fit between the infrastructure and the city, the landscape and the natural environment. 
Hence, it involves questions relating to noise pollution, eyesores, conservation and harmful 
emissions (such as CO2, NOx and particulate matter). 
One crucial question is whether a mega-project should be prepared and realised in one single 
process or whether it is more prudent to split it into manageable constituents and take the 
political decisions in phases. Admittedly, the latter might lead to incomplete, less-than-optimal 
pieces of infrastructure, but it usually makes for greater flexibility. It would also keep various 
options open and perhaps facilitate the decision-making at later stages (Miller & Lessard, 2008). 
Flexibility is a key factor in the efforts to cope with the effects of policy changes or market 
dynamics. 
5. Pitfall no. 4: no programme of functional requirements 
Engineers, in particular, tend to focus on the technical specifications of a mega-project. All too 
often, they are blinded by the ‘technological sublime’ (Trapenberg Frick, 2008): quality comes 
first, followed by timescale – with costs invariably bringing up the rear. If we are to avoid 
overspent budgets and overrun timescales, we need to be aware in advance of market dynamics 
and political discontinuity and we need to start by compiling a programme of functional 
requirements. 
In practice, people do not always think first in terms of a programme of functional requirements. 
The criteria that the project needs to meet and the public values that need to be secured are 
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seldom clear. Traditionally, stakeholders have Type 1 values in their mind; but Type 2 values are 
becoming increasingly important. Only in later stages is concretisation addressed. It is unusual to 
spend time thinking of alternative solutions, let alone consciously generating and designing 
them. Different options are seldom tested against the programme and the social costs and 
benefits are seldom determined for each case. The options can be ranked, starting with the one 
with the highest score and ending with the one with the lowest score. The public authority takes 
a decision on the basis of this information. If it gives the go-ahead, construction can begin. 
A process which uses a concrete programme of functional requirements as its starting point 
creates space for a tendering procedure in which candidates compete in terms of quality and 
innovation as well as price. Unfortunately, in practice this is still the exception rather than the 
rule. 
6. Pitfall no. 5: flawed process architecture 
Normally, agreement is reached on the process architecture either beforehand or along the way. 
Particularly important is the question of which space can and will be presented to the public, the 
politically elected and empowered bodies (especially local authorities), and the potential private 
players, and when this will take place. When the project managers create this space they are not 
always prepared for strategic moves by parties who are – in principle – involved. They will, at all 
events, have to respect the official regulations and standards at EU, national, regional and 
municipal level. 
The Design & Construct (D&C) model has been specifically developed to give competing 
contractors plenty of scope – ideally within the programme of functional requirements – to work 
out their own solutions and to come up with smarter alternatives for the execution of the project. 
Frequently, the parties must be selected on the basis of market forces. This calls for a level 
playing field which precludes the possibility of state support or inside knowledge. Market 
recruitment and political decision-making are a complex mix, which often creates difficulties. 
How can one prevent (overly) transparent public decision-making from damaging the market 
position of the government? And how does one stop parties who feel bypassed or unfairly 
treated from filing claims for damages? It is not a superfluous luxury to seek legal advice on the 
process architecture. 
Most of the time, the actual process becomes dominated by concerns about costs. A lopsided 
emphasis on cost reduction stands in the way of quality and innovation and the realisation of 
Type II criteria in particular. 
In Section 11 we present a basic process architecture in which we identify stages in the decision-
making, leading to go/no-go decisions. 
7. Pitfall no. 6: dissemination of contested information 
The process architecture and the interaction between the players are strewn with pitfalls. 
Misinformation – and sometimes even blatant lies – are apparently disseminated on a large scale 
(Wachs, 1989; 1990; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). Leijten & de Bruijn (2008) call this ‘contested 
information’, i.e. information that is explained in different ways by different players. 
Occasionally, some real battles erupt in which each side hires an experts to launch its views. 
Mega-projects often appear to create their own endogenous political and market dynamics and 
tensions. 
Leijten and de Bruijn (2008) recommend that the players agree beforehand on how to deal with 
the information as it becomes available. 
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The risk of misinformation can be contained by deciding together at an early stage on how 
information is to be treated. The parties can agree in advance on the sources of information that 
will be accepted as authoritative. In the event of conflicting information, they can decide which 
independent expert or institute is to be consulted. Are there any underlying uncertainties? Is it 
possible to pursue a no-regrets policy which takes these uncertainties into account? Is it clearly 
understood who bears the risks of underestimations or overestimations? Can these risks still be 
allocated, if necessary? Does awareness of individual responsibility for risks result in revised 
estimates for investment costs, management costs and transport performance? 
8. Political discontinuity  
The literature on decision-making on mega-projects almost invariably describes the length of the 
process as a complicating factor. According to Hertogh et al. (2008: 39): 
“Major projects take many years to implement, usually much longer than the lifetime of 
governments, and clarity of purpose and business case justification are vital if they are not to be 
hampered by changes in government occasioned either by a change of coalition party or key 
individuals. Equally, it is helpful to seek as much ‘cross-party support’ as possible to ensure that 
it is widely understood that the project is of national importance and not a bone of political 
contention”. 
This certainly makes sense, but a lot more can be said about the issue of political discontinuity. In 
markets we use the term ‘dynamics’ because market changes usually occur gradually. Policy 
changes tend to be more abrupt, depending on the results of elections and new coalitions at 
national, regional and local level. In addition, the relationship between national, regional and 
local policy may be inconsistent. The implications of the terms ‘discontinuity’ and ‘inconsistency’ 
are not necessarily negative. Indeed, some discontinuities may have a positive impact and reduce 
inconsistencies. Even so, the frequent changes that occur in the political composition of the 
respective government may complicate the decision-making on mega-projects. As the entire 
process, from proposal to handover, takes decades rather than years, every mega-project will be 
confronted with government elections and – more often than not – shifts in the balance of 
political power at national, regional and local level. Some mega-projects are so emotionally 
charged and so bound up with differences in political ideologies that they are used as part of the 
stakes during elections and the formation of coalitions. This happens not only at national level 
(parliament, cabinet), but also at regional and local level and – most crucially – around the 
political consensus or dissensus between different tiers of governments (national and local).  
In Europe mega-projects often cross national borders and thus involve international negotiations 
and treaties, and sometimes, international conflicts. In some cases the European Commission also 
participates in the decision-making, especially if subsidies are involved or specific EU themes 
such as the Trans European Networks. Lack of political continuity and public consensus, possibly 
stemming from diametrically opposed backgrounds, can exert an adverse influence on the 
decision-making. When this happens the parties are assailed by tensions which have spilled over 
from other domains. Fortunately, this can also work in the other direction: if government units 
collaborate well in other spheres and if they share similar views, there may be more consensus.  
Though the decision-makers on mega-projects have very few weapons to wield against political 
discontinuity and inconsistency, there are still lessons to be learned in this domain. After all, one 
can hardly object to the workings of democracy even though the results may not be to one’s 
liking. Sometimes, attempts can be made to depoliticise parts of the decision-making; for 
example, when empirical or technical data are being collected. Independent researchers and 
consultants could play a useful role here. It is also advisable to consistently pass on useful and 
relevant information to the public and private players, the professional world at large and the 
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general public, including the press. This raw information may generate some opposition, but it is 
better to amend or even call off a mega-project for valid reasons than to go ahead with it on the 
basis of loosely founded insights. 
In the investigatory stage it is advisable – but not always easy – to keep a step ahead of the 
collection and dissemination of information. It is better not to spring surprises on political bodies 
or the public, but to mention in good time the strategic choices which will present themselves in 
the near future and to state the case for and against them. It is also advisable to share the 
dilemmas with political bodies and the public and to invite them to consider and put forward 
arguments. In the long run political continuity and consistency will be enhanced by prompt and 
relevant insight into facts, prognoses, scenarios and circumstances. Evidence-based policies are a 
godsend for decision-making on mega-projects (regardless of the nature of the final decision) and 
for democracy (TCI, 2004). 
Sometimes, new standards and ground rules are mindful of what insurers used to call ‘Acts of 
God’, given that there is no way of insuring against them. Often, national governments and 
professional sectors are unaware that the European Commission has moved the goalposts. 
Standard-setting authorities should desist from formulating absolute standards, observe 
reasonably long transition periods and, in certain incontestable cases, compensate anyone 
damaged by new standards, particularly if they were unable to prepare for them. 
The importance of communicating information on new standards cannot be underestimated. The 
parties involved must be informed in good time of any likely changes and should be provided 
with information and training programmes to bring them up to speed once the changes come 
into effect. This has scarcely happened at all in the recent past: usually the standards are made 
absolute far too soon (despite uncertainties about safety and environmental problems). There is 
seldom a transition period and there is no information or training. Project managers need to be 
alert to unexpected changes to standards and rules; they also need eyes in the back of their head. 
9. Market dynamics 
Mega-projects figure in different decision-making phases in some markets and affect many other 
markets in the process. In some markets empirical facts have only limited validity. Generally 
speaking, prognoses and estimates – implicit and explicit – are based on assumptions about 
trends in supply and demand, and hence the price developments in relevant markets. A whole 
host of factors comes into play, such as the availability of engineers and other experts for the 
preparation phase; the supply of tradesmen, building materials, installations and raw materials 
for the execution phase; developments in energy prices; the overall economic situation; the 
capital market (including trends in long-term interest rates); inflation and the land market 
(important in the programming phase and the preparation and execution phase). Sometimes 
these market conditions are taken as read, but it is no exception for a mega-project to creates its 
own endogenous market dynamics. These uncertainties can be ‘put into cold storage’ until a later 
date, but there is no guarantee that crucial factors will follow the anticipated pattern. Moreover, 
deviations can have a profound impact on the final cost-benefit analysis. Mobility patterns can 
change within the course of a single decade as a result of, say, competition from other modes of 
transport than those envisioned in the project. Inland shipping, for example, is competing 
strongly with rail and road for the transport of goods to and from major ports like Rotterdam and 
Antwerp. And one can safely assume that the advent of budget airlines such as Easy Jet is 
undermining the demand for high-speed rail transport in Europe. 
It is, of course, easy to spot the impact of market dynamics with the benefit of hindsight. The 
challenge presented by decision-making on mega-projects is to identify market dynamics ex-ante 
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and to be prepared for a mega-project to make an endogenous impact on the markets. The 
information on possible future developments often appears to be contested. 
The best way to deal with unforeseen changes in the market is to apply scenario techniques and 
conduct sensitivity analyses. Changes in policy are often intertwined with changing markets. The 
introduction of a user charge on rail and/or road infrastructure can have an immediate and 
profound impact on the mobility market. It is impossible to fully protect a project against the 
impact of changing markets. Mega-project management will always entail uncertainties and 
risks. 
10. Identification and allocation of risks 
Often, the preparation and realisation of a mega-project is a risky business. Politicians are 
increasingly displaying a preference for public-private partnerships. Private players are being 
recruited in entrepreneurship, creativity and risk-awareness – areas where they are, quite simply, 
superior to public sector organisations. Time and again the question arises as to how the various 
tasks and activities – and more importantly – the risks are to be divided between the public and 
private players beforehand. This presupposes that each party already has a valid idea of the 
nature and extent of the risks, but this is rarely borne out in practice.  
It may be possible to ascertain on a case-by-case basis whether some risks can be insured. 
Insurance companies have built up extensive experience in the identification and quantification 
of risks. Any risks that a promoter decides to bear himself must be included in the budget. 
It is vitally important to identify and quantify potential uncertainties and risks in the contractual 
relations between the parties so that they can be allocated as efficiently as possible. Each player 
will try to determine the nature and extent of the risks and incorporate them in his price. If such 
issues are not settled on time, there may be huge surprises in store. For example, in the public 
tender for the five-part substructure of the Dutch HSL-South there were price differences of 
approximately 40% between the externally verified budget of the Ministry of Transport and the 
bids from the private consortia. Causes: collusion between the building firms, an overheated 
building market (too many mega-projects under construction in the same period) and serious 
underestimation of the overlap risks on the part of the Ministry of Transport (TCI, 2004). 
Overlap risks can be reduced by interface management. They tend to be underestimated (not to 
say neglected) by governments and are sometimes overestimated by market players (whether or 
not on the basis of strategic considerations).  
Contracted alliances with shared benefits and risks are gaining in popularity. It is important to 
identify the risks in different stages of the project, to determine the risk probability and to 
calculate the potential damage. This makes it possible to allocate prices to each risk, to determine 
how each risk can best be allocated and to find out whether is it feasible and advisable to pay 
insurance companies to cover the risks. We have observed that risk analysis entered decision-
making on mega-projects only very recently. It seems that we are still at the beginning of a 
learning curve. 
11. Conclusions and recommendations 
Table 1 summarises the main pitfalls in the early stages of decision-making processes on mega-
projects. These pitfalls may prove fatal as a result of complicating factors, such as the complexity 
of the mega-project; the multi-player and multi-level nature of the decision-making process and 
the many (often unexpected) changes that occur in the long period between the start and finish of 
the project; political discontinuity; changing standards and rules, and market dynamics. 
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Many lessons to prevent or reduce flaws can be learned from past experience (Table 1): 
strengthen the knowledge base of the project; stimulate learning processes during the decision-
making process; adopt a risk analysis followed by an optimal allocation of risks among public 
and private players and, finally, organise ongoing monitoring by accountants. 
Upon closer examination, it appears that a number of frequently cited pitfalls are bound up with 
a lack of political continuity and consistency and market dynamics. Many of the notorious 
interim rises in the costs of mega-projects are the result of fresh insight by political bodies who 
change the scope of the project along the way to make it fit more neatly into the spatial planning 
and to protect the environment against noise and air pollution, blots on the landscape and other 
negative effects. Missed deadlines and deteriorations in cost-benefit ratios are often the result of 
changing political views or of a perceived need for political compromises. 
Table 1. Systematic specification of lessons learned 
Pitfalls Complicating factor Lessons 
1. Absence of a proper problem analysis Complexity;  
Long timespan between start and 
finish;  
Changes relating to political 
discontinuity, changing standards 
and market dynamics; 
Multi-player and multi-level 
decision-making 
Strengthen the know- 
ledge base of the 
project 
2. Lack of project alternatives  Keep learning 
3. Ambiguities about the scope of the project  Increase flexibility 
4. No programme of functional requirements  Formulate such a 
programme 
5. Flawed process architecture  Identify and allocate 
risks 
6. Dissemination of contested information  Organise ongoing 
monitoring 
 
Table 2. Stages of a project and go/no-go decisions 
Phase Go/no-go decision at the end of the phase 
Programme phase Start preparation and elaboration;  
Provide budget for preparation and elaboration;  
From now on apply rules for information to public authorities 
Preparation phase Decide to build;  
Start the execution of the project;  
Provide budget for realisation (public + private) 
Execution phase 
 
Decide to operate;  
Start the operation of the project;  
Make documentation available on preparation and realisation of the 
project 
Operation phase Decide to stop or to restructure operation 
Derived from TCI (2004).   
 
In practice the decision-making is usually pretty chaotic with steps being retraced and decisions 
being reconsidered. It is absolutely crucial to design a process architecture in an early stage. This 
may be redesigned in later stages, but always approved by the parties. Division into phases can 
help point the way (TCI, 2004, see Table 2), each phase ending with a go/no-go decision. The 
problem analysis delivers a document which enables the competent authority to decide whether 
the next phase, the programme phase, can begin, paving the way for a programme of functional 
 
EJTIR 10(1), March 2010, pp. 19-29 
Priemus 
28 
Decision-making on Mega-projects: Drifting on Political  
Discontinuity and Market Dynamics 
 
requirements and an initial estimate of costs based on a reference class. If this leads to a ‘go’ 
decision, the preparation phase, which leads to an execution decision (go/no-go), can begin. A ‘go’ 
decision is linked to fundamental commitments: public and private funding is made available 
and the project is fleshed out in minute detail. The execution phase is followed by the operation 
decision and the operation phase. 
It is not inconceivable that parts of a phase may have to be repeated; for example, the programme 
of functional requirements may need some adjustments to keep pace with later insights. The 
phasing must always make clear the stage which the infrastructure project has reached. It is also 
essential to identify alternatives in an early stage, to keep open as many options as possible so 
that there is enough flexibility to tackle unexpected developments, new insights and changed 
circumstances (Miller & Lessard, 2008). This is much easier in the preparation phase than in the 
execution phase, where financial claims can be expected when changes are proposed. 
Not only is it important that the various components and details of the mega-project be closely 
studied and managed during the preparation phase, the mega-project itself and the process 
architecture must be continually monitored at system level. A risk analysis will make it possible 
to make early identification of the components and interfaces that require special attention in 
each stage (design, structural development, plan review, implementation, building inspection). 
An internal inspection is particularly important where strategic activities are concerned (high risk 
of damage, risk of major damage). The four-eye principle requires that vitally important 
operations be performed by at least two different people to minimise the risk of mistakes or 
tunnel vision. It is equally important that one single person take ultimate responsibility for the 
entire process during each stage. In particular, this person must closely monitor the cohesion and 
synergy of the process and the interfaces between the components. 
There are many references on project management and risk management within the context of 
industrial processes. Lessons may possibly be learned from this sector, but we are not sure, for 
instance, how far experience of the petrochemical industry can be transplanted to traffic 
infrastructure. 
According to the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR, 2008), mega-projects 
must meet both Type I (proper market functioning) and Type II criteria (realisation of long-term 
public values, such as safety, health, resilience and sustainability). 
We have learned from Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) that many players have strong reasons not to follow 
the recommendations formulated in this final section. It often pays off to underestimate market 
dynamics and political discontinuity by underestimating costs and overestimating benefits. It is 
in the interest of the taxpayer to follow our suggestions for improvement. It is a challenge for 
national and local government to urge managers to identify alternatives in an early stage, to 
adopt a clear phasing procedure and to keep the options open in the interests of flexibility. 
After seventy years with no lessons learned (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003) it is time to get down to some 
serious work. 
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